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Abstract 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of patents on drug prices across 
developing countries. It uses sales data on HIV/AIDS drugs in a sample of 34 low and 
middle-income countries between 1995 and mid-2000. The main findings are that patents 
do shift drug prices up, that drug prices are correlated to per capita income levels, and 
that drug firms follow a skimming strategy when pricing new HIV/AIDS drugs. That is, 
there is across country and intertemporal price discrimination in the global drug markets. 
Keywords: Patents; Pricing; Pharmaceuticals; AIDS. 
JEL Codes: L11; L51; L65; O34. 
 
1 Introduction 
The impact of patents on drug prices has emerged as a controversial issue in the face of 
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) public health crisis. Activists blame patents 
for keeping prices out of the reach of those who badly need new drugs called 
antiretroviral drugs (ARV), and lobby strongly for letting generics compete with original 
brand products protected by patents in developing countries. ARV drugs are effective 
and safe drugs that have changed the late stage of the HIV infection, the Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), from a death sentence to a chronic disease. Drug 
firms argue that patents are not a barrier to access to the new drug therapy, because of 
tiered or compassionate pricing, and that patents are key mechanisms to encourage 
research and development of new medicines and vaccines.  
Most of the studies on patents and pricing focus on the effect of patent 
expiration on drug pricing and shares in the US: Hurwitz and Caves (1988); Caves, 
Whinston and Hurwitz (1991); Grabowski and Vernon (1992); Frank and Salkever (1992, 
1997); Griliches and Cockburn (1994); Hellerstein (1994) and, Fisher and Griliches 
(1995). Hudson (1992 and 2000) analyzes drug pricing dynamics and patent expiration 
not only in the US, but also in the UK, Germany, France, and Japan. A common finding 
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 3
of these papers is that the larger the numbers of competitors, the lower drug prices are, 
and that brand name products might even increase in price after the introduction of 
generics. This is what Scherer (1993) named the “generic paradox.” 
Very little attention has been devoted to studying the impact of patent rights on 
drug pricing in developing countries. Some papers attempt to simulate the likely effects 
of product patents on average drug prices in developing countries. In the cases of 
Argentina and India, Challu (1991), Fink (2000), and Watal (2000) obtain impacts of 
patents on average prices of a different order. Impacts of about 200% are obtained by 
using the assumptions that yield the highest impact and of 26% (Watal, 2000), or as low 
as 12% (Fink, 2000), with the assumptions that yield the lowest impact. Using less 
detailed data, Maskus and Eby-Konan (1994) and Subramanian (1995) obtain maximum 
price increases of up to 67% due to the introduction of pharmaceutical product patent 
rights. 
Another stream of works has focused on studying the dynamics of drug pricing. 
Lu and Comanor (1998) described that there ar  two different pricing strategies in the 
drug markets. The pricing strategy named “skimming strategy” corresponds to what Lu 
and Comanor (1998) found to be the pricing strategy for the subset of drugs which 
represent important therapeutic gains, as opposed to the “penetration strategy” that Lu 
and Comanor (1998) found to be the pricing strategy for the subset of drugs which 
largely duplicate the actions currently available products. 
In the skimming strategy cases, drug firms introduce their products at high price 
which later on declines. In the penetration strategy cases, drug firms introduce their 
products at low price which later on increases. The literature on experience goods (those 
whose users determine product attributes only by using the product) explains when 
pioneering brands try to build up their consumer base and their reputation by a low/high 
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 4
pricing sequence (Schmalensee, 1982), and also when monopolists prefer instead to “milk 
its reputation” using a high/low pricing sequence (Shapiro, 1983). The key issue in this 
literature is the buyer’s perceptions of the new product quality. When consumers are 
pessimistic regarding the product quality, the firms needs to build the reputation of the 
product largely by setting a low introductory price followed by a higher regular price. 
When consumers overestimate product quality, the firm will optimally set a high launch 
price but then lower its price over time.1 
This paper tries to fill part of the gap in the empirical literature on drug pricing. It 
investigates the impact f patents on pricing of HIV/AIDS drugs in a sample of low and 
middle-income countries in the late 1990’s. This is a companion paper to that by Borrell 
and Watal (2002) on studying patents and access to HIV/AIDS drugs. The hypothesis is 
that drug prices are higher under patent regimes. Patents legally prevent unauthorized 
manufacture, sale, importation, and using or stocking for sale of the patented product 
during a limited term. Patents prevent competition between the innovator of the drug 
(and any of its licensees) and the imitators (unauthorized providers). Patents prevent 
competition between providers of products that contain the same therapeutically active 
substance, and that only differ slightly in other charact ristics. The lack of such close 
competitors is expected to shift prices upward. 
Additionally, this paper studies how the pricing dynamics differ across patent 
regimes. We expect pricing strategies to differ strongly across patent regimes. Patents 
allow drug firms to get the most from skimming and penetration strategies. By contrast, 
pricing in no-patent regimes will be more closely linked to the dynamics of production 
costs and competition. 
                                                 
1 Bagwell and Riordan (1991) analyze the case in which the firms signal high quality new products 
with prices that are above full information profit maximizing prices. As information about the 
prices diffuses, the price distortion disappears. 
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 5
This paper uses sales data on HIV/AIDS drugs in a sample of 34 low and 
middle- income countries, between 1995 and mid-2000, and reduced form regressions to 
empirically assess the impact of market exclusivity on pricing of clinically tested ARV 
drug bundle (so called “cocktail therapy”). 
Our main finding is that the daily dose price of any “cocktail therapy” differs 
significantly in two dimensions: (1) drug bundles are on average more expensive when 
they include products under patent regime, and (2) drug bundles are on average more 
expensive when they include products under licenses from the firm that originally 
developed the drug. We also find a positive relationship between drug prices and per 
capita income in both patent and non-patent regimes. This finding suggests, that not only 
competition under non-patent regimes drives drug prices to be related to per capita 
income across countries, but also that multinational drug firms have effectively tiered 
their prices to per capita income across countries when drugs are under patent regime. 
Finally, we find that drug firms set a very high initial price and then lower it over 
time during the 9-year period after the date the drug bundle was available on the US 
market only in patent regimes. This pricing strategy, named skimming pricing (as 
opposed to penetration pricing), corresponds to what Lu and Comanor (1998) found to 
be the pricing strategy for drugs, which represent important therapeutic gains. 
Competition prevents price discrimination in no-patent regimes. 
This paper is organized in the following way: section 2 describes the method we 
follow to test whether patents have a positive or negative effect on pricing, and the 
characteristics of the data set. Section 3 offers some descriptive statistics on patents and 
prices. Section 4 shows the results of estimating the impact of patents on pricing. Section 
5 concludes. 
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 6
2 Methodology and Data 
2.1 Methodology 
There are large number of studies in economics that use natural experiments or quasi-
experiment designs to examine outcome measurements for observations in treatment 
groups and comparison groups. Meyer (1995) describes the strengths and weaknesses of 
using quasi-experiments in economics. Among good natural experiments, Meyer (1995) 
cites those induced by policy changes that may allow a researcher to obtain exogenous 
variation in the main explanatory variables. 
This paper uses the difference approach in a quasi-experiment to study how the 
outcome of interest –  i.e. drug pricing, – differs for treatment groups and comparison 
groups that are not randomly assigned. The treatment group contains all the country-
drug pairs for which any ARV drug, in the country of a sample of developing countries, 
is under a patent regime, while the comparison group contains all the country-drug pairs 
for which the drug is not under a patent regime. Quasi-experiments allow us to 
distinguish the effects of exogenous variation in an explanatory variable that is, in other 
situations, endogenously related to the outcome of interest. The estimates of the effect of 
patents on drug prices are usually biased because drug firms apply for patent status 
across countries and drugs in a non-random way. Drug firms apply and renew the patent 
status of a particular drug in a given country only when both of the two following 
conditions hold: (1) when the firm may legally obtain a patent right from the government 
of that particular country (what we will refer to as the “patent regime”) for the drug and 
(2) when the present discounted value of the expected cash flow of patenting that drug in 
that country is positive (what we will refer to as the firm “patenting decision”). 
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 7
This paper overcomes the bias by studying the effect of a policy change on the 
patent regime of a set of HIV/AIDS drugs and country pairs on the outcome of interest 
– i.e. drug pricing. The key identifying assumption in the study is that differences in 
patent regimes across drug-country pairs are exogenous with respect to the outcomes in 
the market for ARV drugs. The paper sustains that patent law changes in the countries 
sampled were driven mainly by bilateral or international agreements and national 
developments, rather than by concerns related to the treatment of HIV patients. 
As Meyer (1995) highlights, three of the main goals of the research design should 
be: (1) having a large enough variation in the key explanatory variables so that it is 
exogenous, (2) finding comparison groups that are comparable, (3) probing the 
implications of the hypotheses under test. 
With respect to the first issue, this paper identifies the factors that drove changes 
in the patent regime to rule out obvious sources of endogeneity. Each drug-country 
patent regime indicator depends on two data: (1) whether patent protection is locally 
available and, (2) when the innovator can apply for patent protection in any of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) member countries. The differences in patent regimes across 
countries, and the timing of the invention of the 14 different ARV molecules (from 1985 
to 1995) lead to an appropriate mix of patent regimes across drug-country-pairs. 
With respect to the second issue, this paper uses different regression 
specifications including different sets of controls to avoid the possibility of omitted 
variables, trends in outcomes and omitted interactions to examine the comparability of 
treatment groups and comparison groups. In the regression analysis, we treat omitted 
variables, trends in outcomes and omitted interactions by controlling for relevant country 
characteristics, and also country, brand licensing status (licensed brands versus non-
licensed brands), pharmaceutical form, and annual fixed effects, and country and year 
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 8
interactions. Additionally, the empirical literature on drug markets draws our attention to 
the additional need for controlling differences in observed drug qualities such as dosage, 
efficacy, and side effects.2 
The following regression equation provides a simple and parsimonious way to 
control  observable differences in the observations of different groups, 
21 δδβαα jitijitijt zzrp ++++=  
where ijtp  is the price of the daily dose of a single, double or triple drug bundle j in 
country i  in year t, itα  are fixed effects for country i and year t, ijr  is the patent regime of 
the drugs of the bundle j in country i , and β is the true causal effect of the treatment on 
the outcome. The regression controls for country and year characteristics ( itz ), and also 
for drug bundle characteristics ( jz ). The regression equation adjusts for observable 
differences between the observations in the different groups. 
 With respect to the third issue, the paper further probes for hypotheses by testing 
whether the causal effect of the patent regime holds in different settings: for single, 
double and triple drug bundles separately, and for countries with variation in drug patent 
                                                 
2 The empirical literature that studies specific drug markets shows that we should control dosage, 
efficacy, toxicity, and side effects among other observed qualities: Berndt, Griliches and Rosset 
(1993) study antihypertensive drugs; Berndt et al. (1995), and Berndt, Pindkyck and Azoulay 
(1999 and 2000) focus on anti-ulcer drugs; Berndt, Cockburn and Griliches (1996) analyze 
antidepressant drugs; and Cockburn and Anis (1998) arthritis drugs. We do not have enough data 
on differences in drug toxicity among ARV’s although higher life-threatening toxicity has been 
related to the use of a type of ARV, the so-called Nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitors 
(NRTI). Therefore, at least drug fixed effects take care of fixed differences in toxicity across drug 
types. 
Page 8 of 35
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 
 9
regimes separately. In any regression equation, the restriction that 1δ  and 2δ  are equal 
across groups is important because otherwise the regression equation will not adjust for 
differences in control variables across groups. 
Scherer and Watal (2001) estimated reduced form pricing equations across 
countries and time by using this same data set. They found a significant negative impact 
of patent rights on average leading multinational prices. They qualified this result as 
‘anomalous’ and driven by: (1) measurement error, or (2) complex interrelationships 
between patent and other variables. 
This study of the impact of patent on prices differs from that conducted by 
Scherer and Watal (2001) in three aspects. First, we study the effect of the patent regime 
indicator on all firms pricing, not only on multinationals. Second, the patent regime 
indicator has been improved with respect to that used by them. It includes data on patent 
rights, exclusive marketing rights (EMR), and ‘pipeline protection’ available to innovators 
across countries and drugs as explained below. Finally, instead of regressing the price of 
each product on a set of country and drug effects, we regress the price of each clinically 
tested bundle of drugs available in any given country and year, on a set of characteristics 
including the patent regime indicator. This is important because ARV drugs have strong 
complementarities in consumption. Effective therapies are usually cocktail therapies 
combining two or three different drugs. Equilibrium prices are likely to be related to the 
dosage, efficacy and adverse reactions of each bundle of drugs that is actually available to 
the AIDS patients in a given country and year. 
2.2 Data 
Treatment of AIDS in rich countries changed dramatically after 1995, when new, more 
effective, and safer drugs were approved. According to Henkel (1999), the combination 
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 10
of the new ARV drugs with the older ones (“cocktail therapy”) “has helped change AIDS 
in the last three years from being an automatic death sentence to what is now often a 
chronic, but manageable, disease.” As Table 1 shows, 14 different products containing 
one molecule, and one product combining two molecules (i.e. a total of 15 products), 
were available in the US by June 2000. 
IMS, the leading collector of data on drug sales world-wide, provided us with annual 
sales data for the 15 ARV’s in 21 different countries and two country groupings, viz. 
French West Africa and Central America, between January 1995 and June 2000.3 IMS 
data consist of unsubsidized annual wholesale sales and revenue estimates corresponding 
to each particular drug presentation sold at retail outlets between 1995 and mid-2000, 
except in 4 cases. IMS reports total aggregated retail and hospital sales (R&H) in South 
Africa, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. IMS data refer only to unsubsidized 
sales. They do not include subsidized distribution of drugs to patients (particularly 
important in Brazil and Thailand), nor do they include any donations of drugs.4 Using 
                                                 
3 IMS provided us with aggregated sales data for two supranational entities: French West Africa, 
comprising aggregate sales in Benin, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, 
Gabon, Guinea and Senegal; and, Central America, including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. All economic indicators for those two supranational entities 
are population weighted averages of the national indicators. The data set includes annual data 
referring to the calendar years from 1995 to 1999, and also to the year from July 1999 to June 
2000. 
4 For each drug presentation, IMS reports data by year, country, molecule, firm, brand name, 
pharmaceutical form, strength, and pack size. Sales revenues obtained from each package or 
presentation at the wholesale level are reported in current $US. Physical sales are reported in 
standard units (number of tablets, vials or teaspoons). IMS did not provide us with sales of the 
active ingredient in milligrams, or in daily doses. 
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 11
IMS data, we compute sales in milligrams for each presentation. We collected data on the 
minimum recommended milligrams for completing a daily dose of our 15 drugs from 
WHO (2000) and PDR-CG (2000). Combining this information, we computed sales in 
terms of the number of daily single-drug treatment dose. We then obtained the price per 
daily single-drug treatment dose by dividing revenues in $US by sales in the number of 
daily treatment doses. 
Patent protection on pharmaceuticals changed substantially in the countries of our 
sample due to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Before January 1st 1995, 14 countries in 
our sample did not grant product patents.5 Between 1996 and 2000, eight of those 
countries introduced patent protection for pharmaceuticals.6 
Under TRIPS, WTO member countries were obliged to allow for the filing of 
product patents for pharmaceuticals by 1st January 1995 and the subsequent grant of 
either product patents or exclusive marketing rights for eligible pharmaceutical products.7 
                                                 
5  These were Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Guatemala, Guinea, India, 
Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Tunisia, Uruguay and Venezuela. Pakistan had a patent law in force, but 
an executive order disallowed pharmaceutical patents. 
6 Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela introduced product patents in 1996; Brazil in 1997; 
Argentina in 1999; Guinea, Guatemala, and Morocco in 2000. We focus on product patents 
(exclusivity related to therapeutically active ingredient) rather than process patents (exclusivity 
related to the method of obtaining such an active ingredient).  Process patents, like other type of 
patents on therapeutic uses, pharmaceutical forms, and so on, are important but accessory ways 
of protecting the main and broader exclusivity right of the innovator, that protecting the 
therapeutic active ingredient from being copied and sold.  
7 When product patents are not available as of 1st January1995, WTO members have to provide a 
system whereby drug patent applications can be filed (often referred to as a “mailbox” system). 
Page 11 of 35
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 
 12
Developing countries were allowed up to 1st January 2005, and the least-developed 
countries up to 1st January 2006 (and now up to 2016 under the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health) so as to formally change patent 
laws to introduce pharmaceutical product patent protection. Furthermore, those lesser-
developed countries may obtain further extensions from WTO on a case-by-case basis. 
In the countries not providing patents to eligible drugs before 1st January 1995, 
TRIPS obligations do not affect drugs that were no longer “new” for patenting purposes 
as of the date of filing in that country, or as of the date of priority accorded to them 
upon request. Therefore, we can conclude that all WTO Members would be obliged to 
make patents (or exclusive marketing rights) available to inventions for which the first 
patent application was made in any WTO member on or after 1st January 1994. 8 
                                                                                                                                            
“Mailbox” applications do not have to be examined until the local patent law is passed. However, 
when a drug subject to a “mailbox application” obtains marketing approval before the local 
patent office makes a decision on whether granting a patent right or not, the following special 
rule applies: An Exclusive Marketing Right (EMR) of up to five years (or until the patent is 
granted or rejected, whichever is shorter) must be granted from the date of local marketing 
approval, provided that a patent has been filed for that drug and a patent and marketing approval 
obtained in another WTO member country after 1st January 1995. 
8 An invention is considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art. The “state 
of the art” is generally defined, as everything made available to the public by means of a written 
or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the patent application. 
Under WTO rules, incorporating existing WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) 
conventions, for purposes of determining novelty, patent applicants may claim the priority of an 
earlier application made during the period of 12 months from the date of filing. It is theoretically 
possible to have a patent applicant not to claim priority from the date of an earlier filing and to 
claim that products for which patent applications were filed elsewhere from say, mid-1993 are 
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 We lacked direct data on patents granted for each of the 14 different ARV 
molecules in each country. Therefore, we assessed instead the patent regime for each 
drug-country pair. We gathered information on whether product patents for 
pharmaceuticals were available in each country for a year after each ARV product patent 
application was filed in according to the key priority date given in the US.  
Balasubramaniam (2000) provides the date of filing of the patent application, 
which the US Patent and Trademark Office reports as the key patent for each ARV.9 
Using a variety of sources, including local legislation and the complete cross-country 
data-set compiled by Qian (2001), we obtained the hypothetical date from which patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals could have been granted for each drug in each one of the 
34 countries of our sample. 
We built up the patent regime indicator using the key patent priority date and the 
date from which each country could have granted patent protection. For each drug-
country-pair, we assessed whether product patents would have been available locally 
within a year from the key priority date of each molecule. TRIPS provisions on exclusive 
                                                                                                                                            
novel (since later than this date the application would then be published by another patent office 
after 18 months and so would no longer be novel as of or after January 1995), but we believe that 
this is unlikely to happen in practice. 
9 The US Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act required that drug firms provide patent 
information with all new drug applications. Taking into account this information, the FDA sets 
the exclusivity term during which an abbreviated new drug application is not granted (a generic is 
not approved). The Electronic Orange Book (FDA, 2000) publishes the number of the appropriate 
patents claimed by the firms when the drugs are subject to approval. Using the patent numbers, 
Balasubramaniam (2000) obtained each ARV key priority date from the US Patent and 
Trademark Office online database (http://www.uspto.gov). We thank Mike Palmedo from the 
Consumer Project on Technology for explaining to us how this data was gathered. 
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 14
marketing rights (EMR’s) affect four of the 14 ARV molecules. For the following four 
molecules, patent applications could have been filed after January 1st 1995 in all WTO 
countries apart from the country where the priority date was set: Nelfinavir (key patent 
priority date - February 2nd 1994); Delavirdine (key patent priority date – February 22nd 
1994); Ritonavir (key patent priority date - April 25th 1995); Efavirenz (key patent priority 
date - June 2nd 1995). We set the patent regime dummy variable to be 1 for these four 
drugs in all countries in our sample because local governments would be obliged to 
provide EMR or product patents to the innovators of these molecules under TRIPS 
rules. 
Remember that the patent regime indicator does not report whether the 
innovator was granted or had even applied for patent protection for each drug-country-
pair of our sample. In other words, it does not reflect the actual patent status of the drug. 
It only shows that patent or other market exclusivity status was attainable for some years, 
to the best of our knowledge. So, the patent regime is arguably exogenous to any firm 
decision. Taking into account the value of patent protection, innovators may decide 
whether or not it pays to apply in each one of the countries that make available such 
rights. 
Table 2 shows that Central America, French West Africa, Malaysia and South 
Africa led the sample in the number of drugs for which patents could have been granted 
by 2000. In these four countries or country groupings, the patent holders of all 15 ARV’s 
could apply for patents.10 In a second set of countries, patent laws have changed recently 
to make product patents available for pharmaceuticals: Mexico (1991), Thailand (1992), 
                                                 
10 Product patents for drugs have been granted in all Central American countries since the 1950s, 
except in Guatemala where product patents were introduced in 2000. We set the patent regime 
indicator to be equal to 1, in all the country-drug-pairs corresponding to Central America. 
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 15
Chile (1991) and Indonesia (1993). Mexico and Thailand led this second group of 
countries because they granted the so-called ‘pipeline’ protection when introducing 
legislation on product patents. In these countries, innovators could apply for patent 
protection for drugs in the ‘pipeline’, i.e. drugs not already marketed although not ‘new’ 
for patenting, when the new law came into force. Finally, in 14 countries in our sample, 
innovators could only apply for patents or EMR’s for the 4 drugs affected by the TRIPS 
rules on ‘mailbox applications’. 
Local prices of ARV drugs differ substantially from US prices across countries 
and time. Table 4 shows the wholesale minimum price per year of a set of clinically tested 
ARV therapies in any oral solid form (tablets, capsules, and the like): single-drug therapy; 
double-drug therapy and the so-called Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART) 
three-drug therapy. At the top end, the lowest priced annual triple drug bundle per 
patient in 1999 was higher in Mexico (US$ 8,149), Colombia ($US 7,728), Chile ($US 
6,853) than in the US ($US 6,770). At the bottom end, the minimum price per annual 
triple drug bundle is $US 4,366 in South Africa and $US 3,025 in Brazil. The last column 
in Table 4 shows that the minimum price per annual triple drug bundle in 1999 was 
higher than the per capita income in $PPP in all the countries of the sample except in 
Brazil (47% of per capita income), Argentina (58%) and Chile (81%), while the minimum 
price was 21% of the per capita income in the US. All minimum prices of single and 
double drug bundles are smaller than the minimum price in the US, particularly in India, 
Thailand, Brazil, and South Africa.  
  We also matched each local product to an equivalent product in the US using 
data on the minimum list price in the US.11 In 1995, sales weighted mean prices were 
                                                 
11 As reported in the Red Book (1995, 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000), the PDR-Generics (1997), 
and PDR-CG (1998, 1999 and 2000). We matched each local price with the US minimum 
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quite close to US wholesale list prices in current $US in all countries for which data is 
available. However, by mid-2000, prices dropped to one-half or less of US prices in five 
countries: India, South Africa, Brazil, Malaysia and Thailand. Note that patents were 
available for all drugs in S. Africa and in Malaysia and for most in Thailand. In eight 
countries, prices dropped to levels of between 53% and 73% of the US prices. In 
contrast, prices increased in Mexico and Venezuela, and did not decrease much in 
Argentina and Colombia. 
Table 5 also shows that local prices in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) 
were well above their US counterparts for all countries in 1995 (ranging from 118% to 
394%). Between 1995 and 1999, relative local to US prices dropped in all countries 
except in Mexico and Venezuela. However, by 1999, mean local prices in PPP terms 
were higher than US prices in all countries (ranging from 106% to 286%) except Brazil 
(60%). 
What are the drivers of the pricing dynamics? Table 6 shows that the cumulative 
annual decrease in the sales weighted mean price in current $US between 1995 and 1999 
(column 1) is driven by three factors: (1) the introduction of cheaper new products 
particularly in India, Uruguay, French West Africa, and Malaysia (column 2); (2) the drop 
in nominal prices in current $US for the drugs already on the market, particularly in 
Central America, the Philippines, South Africa, and Peru (column 3); which in turn is 
mainly driven by (3) the depreciation of the exchange rate between the local, and the US 
currency, particularly in the Philippines, South Africa, and Peru (column 4). 
Table 7 shows that relative price indices in local currency (column 1) decreased in 
all countries except Thailand, Malaysia, and Argentina. Patients benefited from lower 
                                                                                                                                            
wholesale list price for each particular drug and pharmaceutical form pair between 1995 and 
2000. 
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prices in local currencies because many firms were not able to increase nominal prices 
(column 2) to offset the negative impact of local inflation (column 3). 
3 Results 
Table 8 shows summary statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis. The 
dependent variable in the pricing regressions is the log of the price per daily dose of any 
clinically tested drug bundle available to patients in any country, in any year. There are 
2,459 clinically proven one-drug, two-drug, or three-drug bundles available to AIDS 
patients in our data set. The right hand side variables of interest in the pricing regressions 
are the dummies that are equal to 1 when (1) the bundles include at least one original 
drug in a patent regime, (2) when the bundles includes at least one original drug in a no-
patent regime, and (3) when the bundles includes at least a generic in a patent regime. 
The omitted category is the case when all the drugs in the bundle are local copies 
introduced in no patent regimes.  
We control for different vectors of price shifters. Table 9 shows the results from 
estimating different specifications of the pricing equation. In column (1) we include the 
country mean income, the country income inequality, the dosage, the efficacy, the 
adverse reactions of each bundle, and the fixed effects related to the number of years 
since the drug bundle was available in the US (1…12), the number of drugs contained in 
each bundle (1, 2 or 3), pharmaceutical form (oral solid, oral liquid, vials), years 
(1995…1999), and a fixed effect for controlling when the data also includes  hospital 
sales. In column (2) we add a set of country fixed effects. In column (3), we add to this 
latter specification a set of country-year pair effects. Table 10 shows the results of this 
specification including country-year pair effects for single drug, double drug and triple 
drug therapy separately. It is important to check the robustness of the results to the type 
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of drug therapy because when including double and triple therapies in the regression, we 
might be introducing heterocedasticity of unknown form. 
 Results in table 9 and 10 do not differ much. As a larger number of drugs of the 
bundle are under a patent regime, expected prices increase. This result becomes more 
significant as we include country, year, and country-year pair fixed effects. The effect of 
the patent regime variable grows as we go from single therapy to triple therapy. 
 Results in column 3 of table 9 allow us to compare expected prices. Panel A in 
Table 11 shows that drug bundles containing at least one original drug in a patent regime 
are on average priced 70% higher than drug bundles containing only local copies 
marketed in no patent regimes. 
Table 11 also shows that drug bundles containing at least one generics marketed 
in a patent regime (probably when th  drug goes off patent in country-drugs previously 
under patent regime) are on average priced 22% higher then drug bundles containing 
only local copies. Moreover, drug bundles containing at least one original drug are priced 
16% higher than local copies even when it is introduced in no-patent regimes. Panels B, 
C and D show the estimates of these price differences using the results in Table 10. 
These results show that patients have access to cheaper drug bundles, and to a 
wider range of prices in no-patent regimes i.e., drug bundles containing only cheaper 
local or generic non-licensed brands rather than bundles containing more expensive big 
pharma brands. That is the expected result from the competition among different firms 
offering drugs that contain the same chemical entities on the market. For instance, we 
observe that in a no-patent regime such as the corresponding to the country-drug pair 
Argentina-Zidovudine eight firms compete offering close substitute brands. 
Results also show that competition of just one generic firm at the end of the 
patent term also induces a reduction of prices. For instance, a generic Canadian firm 
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introduced Zidovudine in Central America as a non-licensed brand after the exclusivity 
term of the original developer ended. These results suggest that drug prices flatten out 
only gradually as new competitors come in. Furthermore, these price differentials also 
show that big pharma licensed brands are priced differently across patent regimes. 
Tables 9 also show that the prices across countries are closely related to each 
country per capita income and income inequality. More importantly, the positive link 
between prices and mean income is persistent across patent regimes, and gets stronger 
for drug bundles containing more drugs. The relationship between prices and income 
inequality is ambiguous, probably because the functional form is too restrictive to handle 
the non-linearity relationship between prices and income distribution. However, these 
results are consistent with the assumption that price relatives depend not only on the 
degree of differentiation among products on the market, but also on the income 
distribution of each country, the characteristics of the outside good, and the marginal and 
fixed costs of production. 
Finally, tables 9 and 10 show that launch prices are very high, and that drug 
bundle prices adjust down strongly. Figure one uses the results of a regression using 
country-year fixed effects and allowing for different time trends for single, double and 
triple therapies to predict the evolution of mean prices across the life cycle of the 
products. The figure shows that drug firms use the so called “skimming strategy” when 
pricing new drug in the case of original drugs in patent-regimes. This is the pricing 
strategy named “skimming strategy.” More should be studied to understand the 
fundamentals of this strategy, particularly, whether and why drug firms are discriminating 
prices intertemporally and across countries. 
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4 Conclusions 
Our main finding is that the average daily dose price of any ARV “cocktail therapy” 
differs significantly between the treatment group of country-drug pairs in which 
pharmaceutical firms may apply for product patent rights, and the comparison group of 
country-drug pairs in which pharmaceutical firms may not apply for product patent 
rights. We find that on average cocktail therapies are more expensive when they include 
big pharma licensed brand products. 
Additionally, we find evidence of a persistent relationship between drug prices 
and per capita income under patent and no-patent regimes, and a strong decreasing trend 
in prices. Sales-weighted average ARV prices were quite close to US average prices in all 
countries by 1995. By mid-2000, these prices had dropped significantly in current $US. 
However, ARV prices were still well above US prices in PPP terms in all poor countries 
throughout the period under study. Prices in $US decreased due to two factors: (1) the 
introduction of cheaper local and generic brands in local markets; and (2) firms’ 
difficulties in increasing nominal prices when local currencies depreciated. Patients do 
not, however, benefit from decreasing prices in nominal local currency terms, but benefit 
from decreasing prices in real terms because of firms’ inability to increase nominal prices 
to offset the negative impact of local inflation. Drug firms appear to use the “skimming 
strategy” when pricing new drugs in patent regimes. 
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6 Tables 
Table 1.  ARV’s approved in the US by June 2000 (from older to newer in the US) 
Molecule generic name Drug type Brand name in the US 
Firm name in the 
US 
Year of key 
patent 
application
Launch 
Year in 
the US
ZIDOVUDINE (AZT) NRTI Retrovir ® Glaxo Wellcome 1985 1987 
DIDANOSINE (DDI) NRTI Videx ® Bristol-Myer 1987 1991 
ZALCITABINE (DDC) NRTI Hivid ® Roche Labs 1987 1992 
STAVUDINE (D4T) NRTI Zerit ® Bristol-Myer 1986 1994 
LAMIVUDINE (3TC) NRTI Epivir ® Glaxo Wellcome 1989 1995 
SAQUINAVIR PI Invirase ® and Fortovase ® Roche Labs 1990 1995 
INDINAVIR PI Crixivan ® Merck 1993 1996 
NEVIRAPINE NNRTI Viramune ® Roxane 1993 1996 
RITONAVIR PI Norvir ® Abott Pharm 1995 1996 
DELAVIRDINE NNRTI Rescriptor ® Agouron 1994 1997 
LAMIVUDINE & 
ZIDOVUDINE  NRTI Combivir ® Glaxo Wellcome 1989 1997 
NELFINAVIR PI Viracept ® Agouron 1994 1997 
ABACAVIR NRTI Ziagen ® Glaxo Wellcome 1989 1998 
EFAVIRENZ NNRTI Sustiva ® Du Pont Pharm. 1995 1998 
AMPRENAVIR PI Agenerase ® Glaxo Wellcome 1993 1999 
Source: PDR (2000), Balasubramaniam (2000), and FDA (2000). 
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Table 2. - Number of drugs for which the innovator 
could obtain patent or EMR rights 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
US 6 9 12 13 15 15 
CENTRAL AMERICA 6 9 12 13 15 15 
FRENCH WEST AFRICA 6 9 12 13 15 15 
MALAYSIA 6 9 12 13 15 15 
SOUTH AFRICA R&H 6 9 12 13 15 15 
PHILIPPINES R&H 6 9 12 14 15 15 
MEXICO 5 8 11 12 13 13 
THAILAND R&H 4 7 10 11 13 13 
INDONESIA R&H  2 5 8 10 11 11 
CHILE 1 4 6 7 8 8 
BRAZIL 0 1 4 4 4 4 
ARGENTINA 0 1 4 4 4 4 
BANGLADESH 0 1 4 4 4 4 
COLOMBIA 0 1 4 4 4 4 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 0 1 4 4 4 4 
EGYPT 0 1 4 4 4 4 
ECUADOR 0 1 4 4 4 4 
INDIA 0 1 4 4 4 4 
MOROCCO 0 1 4 4 4 4 
PAKISTAN 0 1 4 4 4 4 
PERU 0 1 4 4 4 4 
TUNISIA 0 1 4 4 4 4 
URUGUAY 0 1 4 4 4 4 
VENEZUELA 0 1 4 4 4 4 
n.d.: no data. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on local legislation, 
Balasubramaniam (2000) and Qian (2001). 
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Table 3. - Number of drugs available by country and year 
(of which under patent regime) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
US 6 (6) 9 (9) 12 (12) 13 (13) 15 (15)
ARGENTINA 4 (0) 7 (1) 10 (2) 12 (3) 14 (4) 
CHILE 0  1 (0) 5 (0) 9 (3) 12 (5) 
COLOMBIA 1 (0) 4 (1) 6 (1) 10 (2) 12 (3) 
THAILAND R&H 3 (1) 6 (4) 8 (6) 10 (8) 12 (10) 
MEXICO 3 (2) 3 (2) 5 (4) 8 (7) 10 (9) 
SOUTH AFRICA R&H 3 (3) 4 (4) 6 (6) 9 (9) 10 (10) 
FRENCH WEST AFRICA 2 (2) 2 (2) 4 (4) 8 (8) 9 (9) 
BRAZIL 1 (0) 4 (0) 4 (0) 5 (0) 7 (0) 
MALAYSIA 1 (1) 2 (2) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 
URUGUAY 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 5 (1) 7 (2) 
CENTRAL AMERICA 1 (1) 1 (1) 4 (4) 5 (5) 5 (5) 
INDIA n.d.  n.d.  1 (0) 2 (0) 5 (0) 
VENEZUELA 0  0  2 (0) 3 (0) 5 (0) 
PHILIPPINES R&H 1 (1) 2 (2) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 0  0  0  0  3 (0) 
ECUADOR 0  1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 3 (0) 
PERU 0  0  1 (0) 3 (0) 3 (0) 
INDONESIA R&H 1 (0) 3 (0) 4 (1) 2 (1) 2 (1) 
BANGLADESH 0  0  0  0  0  
EGYPT 0  0  0  0  0  
MOROCCO 0  0  0  0  0  
PAKISTAN 0  0  0  0  0  
TUNISIA 0  0  0  0  0  
n.d.: no data. 
R&H: Retail & Hospital sales. Otherwise, retail sales only. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on IMS. 
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Table 4. - Wholesale minimum price for an annual ARV therapy in 1999 (tablets only) 
 Single Therapy 
Double 
Therapy 
Triple Therapy 
(HAART) 
Per Capita Income 
(PPP$)
US 2533 5114 6770 31910
ARGENTINA 1567 3845 6632 11324
CHILE 1513 4825 6853 8370
SOUTH AFRICA R&H 835 2023 4366 8318
URUGUAY 1533 7941 .. 8280
MALAYSIA 1247 3153 .. 7963
MEXICO 1195 2589 8149 7719
BRAZIL 757 1982 3025 6317
COLOMBIA 1431 2862 7824 5709
THAILAND R&H 593 2029 4345 5599
VENEZUELA 1869 4432 6301 5268
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1290 4161 .. 4653
PERU 1476 4061 .. 4387
PHILIPPINES R&H 1915 4770 6685 3815
CENTRAL AMERICA 1181 3019 .. 3545
EQUADOR 954 2692 .. 2605
INDONESIA R&H 1299 3408 .. 2439
INDIA 634 1319 7728 2149
FRENCH WEST AFRICA 1411 3363 6624 1092
 
HAART: Highly Active ARV Therapy 
Source: Author’s computations on the price of single double and triple clinically tested drug 
bundles that can be combined using the drugs available in each country in 1999 based on IM. 
Per capita incomes from World Bank (2000). 
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Table 5. - Sales weighted local to US price ratios  
At current $US At purchasing power parity 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
URUGUAY 2.68 0.99 0.60 1.07 1.62 1.15 3.94 1.40 0.84 1.48 2.26
VENEZUELA .. .. 0.52 0.66 1.01 1.11 .. .. 0.81 0.94 1.45
MEXICO 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.66 0.74 0.91 1.18 1.36 1.42 1.24 1.29
ARGENTINA 0.95 0.97 0.86 0.87 0.91 0.83 1.38 1.42 1.25 1.27 1.36
COLOMBIA 1.18 1.45 1.00 0.97 0.88 0.79 3.01 3.51 2.31 2.32 2.24
CHILE .. 1.13 0.90 0.76 0.79 0.73 .. 1.92 1.57 1.25 1.41
INDONESIA R&H 1.06 0.89 0.70 0.33 0.68 0.69 2.91 2.36 2.01 1.88 2.86
CENTRAL AMERICA 0.78 0.79 0.87 0.66 0.67 0.66 1.89 1.87 1.94 1.41 1.50
EQUADOR .. 0.84 0.74 0.57 0.62 0.59 .. 1.66 1.45 1.13 1.24
FRENCH WEST AFRICA 1.15 1.10 0.88 0.63 0.60 0.57 3.31 3.08 2.55 1.80 1.72
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC .. .. .. .. 0.65 0.56 .. .. .. .. 1.59
PERU .. .. 0.77 0.69 0.57 0.53 .. .. 1.32 1.17 1.06
PHILIPPINES R&H 1.02 0.98 0.89 0.54 0.58 0.53 3.42 3.11 2.96 2.22 2.17
THAILAND R&H 0.81 0.77 0.62 0.52 0.55 0.50 1.78 1.68 1.56 1.57 1.57
MALAYSIA 0.86 0.81 0.67 0.53 0.50 0.47 1.65 1.51 1.31 1.32 1.17
BRAZIL 0.88 0.73 0.64 0.55 0.42 0.44 1.31 1.02 0.87 0.78 0.60
SOUTH AFRICA R&H 0.87 0.73 0.69 0.53 0.44 0.38 1.94 1.81 1.68 1.40 1.17
INDIA n.d. n.d. 0.63 0.42 0.30 0.20 n.d. n.d. 2.91 1.99 1.43
n.d.: no data. 
..: no drug available. 
Author’s calculations based on IMS, WHO (2000), Red Book (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000), PDR-
Generics (1997) and PDR-CG (1998, 1999, 2000). 
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Table 6. - Drivers of Pricing Dynamics in $US 
(annual cumulative change between 1995 and 1999)1 
 Mean price in 
$US 
Entry & 
Mix 
ARV price 
index in $US 
Local 
Currency 
INDIA -30.50% -22.36% -8.14% -8.16%
SOUTH AFRICA R&H -16.45% -4.81% -11.65% -12.22%
URUGUAY -15.29% -13.76% -1.53% -7.65%
PERU -15.23% -3.60% -11.63% -11.26%
FRENCH WEST AFRICA -14.81% -11.10% -3.72% -26.22%
MALAYSIA -14.72% -11.96% -2.75% -9.90%
BRAZIL -10.87% -0.01% -10.86% -15.67%
PHILIPPINES R&H -8.36% 2.67% -11.03% -9.94%
COLOMBIA -7.91% -8.29% 0.38% -15.09%
CHILE -7.13% 0.79% -7.92% -9.22%
THAILAND R&H -6.96% -2.26% -4.70% -9.90%
CENTRAL AMERICA -6.86% 10.67% -17.53% -6.14%
ECUADOR -5.78% -5.78% .. ..
INDONESIA R&H -2.08% 4.46% -6.54% -33.19%
ARGENTINA 2.08% 0.93% 1.14% 0.01%
MEXICO 3.45% -0.51% 3.96% -9.48%
VENEZUELA 27.33% 28.57% -1.24% -10.18%
1 Or between the first year when any of the ARV’s is locally available and 1999. 
..: not available. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on IMS, WHO (2000), PDR (2000), IMF 
(2001). 
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Table 7. - Drivers of Pricing Dynamics in Local Currency 
(annual cumulative change in the following factors) 
 Relative Price 
Index in Local 
Currency 
Nominal Price 
Index in Local 
Currency 
Inflation Shocks on 
Relative Prices in 
Local Currency 
FRENCH WEST AFRICA -49.95% 22.51% -72.46%
CENTRAL AMERICA -20.65% -11.39% -9.27%
VENEZUELA -15.96% 8.95% -24.91%
PHILIPPINES R&H -9.00% -1.09% -7.90%
INDIA -7.15% 0.03% -7.18%
SOUTH AFRICA R&H -7.09% 0.58% -7.67%
MEXICO -5.98% 13.43% -19.41%
INDONESIA R&H -5.03% 26.65% -31.68%
PERU -4.73% -0.36% -4.37%
BRAZIL -4.52% 4.81% -9.33%
CHILE -3.26% 1.29% -4.55%
URUGUAY -1.08% 6.12% -7.20%
COLOMBIA -0.82% 15.47% -16.29%
THAILAND R&H 1.66% 5.21% -3.54%
MALAYSIA 2.01% 7.15% -5.13%
ARGENTINA 2.28% 1.14% 1.14%
ECUADOR .. .. ..
..: drugs available only two in 1998 and 1999. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on IMS, WHO (2000), PDR (2000). 
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Table 8. - Summary Statistics 
Observations: 2,459 single, double and triple drug bundles in 23 countries or 
regions that combine 14 different drugs between 1995 and 1999   
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price per minimum daily dose 20.66 20.59 0.13 141.97
Drugs in Patent Regimes (%) 0.37 0.39 0.00 1.00
Original Brands (%) 0.71 0.34 0.00 1.00
Original drugs in patent regimes (%) 0.32 0.38 0.00 1.00
Country Mean Income 8684.47 3023.32 1092.00 11844.00
Country Income Inequality (Gini, %) 49.28 5.61 36.45 64.33
Including an oral liquid 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Including a vial 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
2 drugs 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
3 drugs 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
Number of Doses a Day 4.47 1.87 1.00 12.00
Efficacy 0.21 0.24 -0.14 0.90
Adverse Reactions 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.29
Retail and Hospital sales 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
First year on the US market 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Second year on the US market 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Third year on the US market 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Fourth year on the US market 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
Fifth year on the US market 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Sixth year on the US market 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Seventh year on the US market 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Eighth year on the US market 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
Ninth year on the US market 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Tenth year on the US market 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00
Eleventh year on the US market 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
Twelfth year on the US market  0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
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Table 9. - Drug Bundle Pricing Regressions – OLS 
Coefficient (Standard Errors) 
Single, Double and Triple Therapy (n=2,459) 
 Log of Price per Daily Dose of a Drug Bundle 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Local copies in no-patent regime -- --  -- --  -- --  
Original drug in patent regime .34 (.17) + .56 (.07) ** .53 (.08) **
Original drug in no-patent regime .12 (.12)  .16 (.12)  .15 (.12) + 
Generics after patent expiration .09 (.16)  .06 (.07)  .19 (.07) **
Log of Country Mean Income .23 (.08) ** .23 (.51)  .32 (.06) **
Country Income Inequality (Gini, %) -.15 (.48)  5.96 (1.56) **   
Number of Doses per Day .17 (.04) ** .13 (.04) ** .13 (.04) **
Efficacy .42 (.10) ** .20 (.15)  .17 (.14)  
Adverse Reactions -1.63 (.63) * -.84 (.23) ** -.73 (.23) **
Years in the US market:       
First -- --  -- --  -- --  
Second -.12 (.04) ** -.19 (.07) * -.15 (.26)  
Third -.14 (.07) * -.18 (.08) * -.13 (.08)  
Fourth -.31 (.09) ** -.27 (.07) ** -.10 (.11)  
Fifth -.33 (.09) ** -.27 (.09) ** -.21 (.07) **
Sixth -.18 (.10) + -.19 (.12)  -.22 (.05) **
Seventh -.25 (.10) ** -.22 (.11) + -.13 (.08) + 
Eighth -.30 (.14) + -.28 (.11) ** -.16 (.08) * 
Ninth -.36 (.12) ** -.36 (.10) ** -.25 (.09) **
Tenth .17 (.10)  .06 (.11)  -.32 (.08) **
Eleventh .11 (.08)  .03 (.09)  .16 (.08) + 
Twelfth .05 (.07)  .05 (.08)  .13 (.06) * 
Fixed Effects:    
Pharmaceutical Form Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Drugs Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes  
Country  Yes  
Country-Year   Yes 
R2 .64 .71 .73 
Hospital sales fixed effects included. 
Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Country. 
Significant at 1% (**), 5% (*), or 10% (+). 
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Table 10. - Drug Bundle Pricing Regressions – OLS 
Coefficient (Standard Errors) 
 Log of Price per Daily Dose of a Drug Bundle 
 Single Therapy (n=586) 
Double Therapy 
(n=1,428) 
Triple Therapy 
(n=445) 
Local copies in no-patent regime -- --  -- --  -- --  
Original drug in patent regime .62 (.11) ** .48 (.06) ** .63 (.05) **
Original drug in no-patent regime .29 (.15) + .11 (.08) +    
Generics after patent expiration .25 (.09) *      
Number of Doses per Day .14 (.08) + .20 (.07) ** -.01 (.01)  
Efficacy .33 (.24)  -.01 (.13)  1.02 (.18) **
Adverse Reactions .07 (.88)  .88 (.62)  -.66 (.50)  
Years in the US market:      
First -- --  -- --  -- --  
Second -.04 (.09)  -.22 (.15)  -.36 (.02) **
Third .03 (.13)  -.25 (.16)     
Fourth -.15 (.10)  -.34 (.20)  -.06 (.05)  
Fifth -.15 (.07) * -.40 (.27)  -.02 (.05)  
Sixth -.15 (.10)  -.21 (.18)    
Seventh -.30 (.10) ** -.21 (.21)    
Eighth -.39 (.15) * -.30 (.22)    
Ninth -.49 (.15) ** -.43 (.28)    
Tenth .16 (.11)      
Eleventh .13 (.11)      
Twelfth .06 (.13)      
Fixed Effects:    
Pharmaceutical Form Sí Sí Sí 
Number of Drugs Sí Sí Sí 
Country-Year Sí Sí Sí 
R2 .51 .41 .27 
Hospital sales fixed effects included. 
Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Country. 
Significant at 1% (**), 5% (*), or 10% (+). 
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Table 11. – Mean Price Differences by Patent Regime and Licensing Status 
A. - All sample: Single, Double and Triple Therapy (n=2,459) 
Local copies in no-patent regime 100 
Original drug in patent regime 170 (**) 100 
Original drug in no-patent regime 116 (+)  
Generics after patent expiration 122 (**) 72 
B. - Single therapy (n=586) 
Local copies in no-patent regime 100 
Original drug in patent regime 186 (**)  
Original drug in no-patent regime 135 (+)  
Generics after patent expiration 127 (*)  
C. - Double therapy (n=1428) 
Local copies in no-patent regime 100  
Original drug in patent regime 162 (**)  
Original drug in no-patent regime 112   
Generics after patent expiration    
D. - Triple therapy (n=445) 
Local copies in no-patent regime 100 
Original drug in patent regime 188 (**)  
Original drug in no-patent regime    
Generics after patent expiration    
From the estimates including country-year fixed effects. Price differences with respect to the no-
patent and unlicensed brand (local firm) are statistically significant at 1% (**), 5% (*), or 10% 
(+). 
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Fig 1. Daily Price Across Time Since US Launch Date
Bands: 95% prediction conf. interval
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